Tuesday, June 24, 2014

Michelle Neely, "Reading Thoreau's Animals"

Michelle Neely
Connecticut College
“Reading Thoreau’s Animals”


Thoreau writes about animals wonderfully, and often. In Walden, The Maine Woods, the journals, some of the essays, and elsewhere he shows himself to be a careful and sympathetic observer of nonhuman animal life, yet his ethical reasoning from his observations does not always please. Walden’s exploration of the ethical, intellectual, and spiritual consequences of taking animal life in particular seems frequently to annoy both readers and critics put off by what they see as Thoreau’s “exasperating” fixation on purity,[i] but even Thoreau’s fine depictions of squirrels, chickadees, and other “brute neighbors” in Walden, the journals, and other writings, can be dismissed as fanciful flights of anthropomorphism. 
Perhaps Thoreau’s “instinct”[ii] about killing animals and consuming animal bodies cannot be conveyed to any who have never felt its like; ethical insights can be individual and incommunicable, a truth the philosopher Cora Diamond has named “the difficulty of reality.”[iii] But some of the value of reading Thoreau’s animals, and the challenging nature of his thinking about the material world, can, I think, be illuminated. In the longer essay from which I draw my presentation, I will offer a brief close reading of one of Walden’s most famous “animal” passages and then explore some of the more significant ways in which Thoreau’s engagement with nonhuman animals resonates with recent theoretical developments in posthumanism, new materialism, materialist ecocriticism, and Object-Oriented Ontology. Ultimately, I wish to demonstrate that Thoreau’s animal thought frequently decenters the human and displays his commitment to giving “materiality its due,” as Diana Coole and Samantha Frost have said of “the New Materialisms” more generally. In the process, I will make a case for paying greater attention to the way that Thoreau’s ethical thought may often be grounded in careful observation the material. Finally, I will argue that Thoreau’s evident pleasure in boundary confusion is an important part of his ability to imagine a more open and ecological form of community.
In the case of Walden in particular, and in much of Thoreau’s work more generally, I would further like to suggest that anthropomorphism is a mode rich with ethical and epistemological possibilities: for Thoreau the naturalist, philosopher, and poet, anthropomorphism is not simply an act of imagination, it’s frequently a fact of attention to the ontology of the nonhuman. Moreover, anthropomorphism has real ethical possibilities. Kari Weil, building on trauma theory’s concept of “critical empathy” as a “conjunction of affect and critical awareness that may be understood to constitute the basis of an empathy not grounded in affinity,” has suggested that we “call an ethical relating to animals (whether in theory or in art) ‘critical anthropomorphism’ in the sense that we open ourselves to touch and be touched by others as fellow subjects and may imagine their pain, pleasure, and need in anthropomorphic terms, but stop short of believing that we can know their experience” (20). Thoreau’s anthropomorphism is indeed a vehicle for imagining nonhumans as fellow subjects, and for noticing the shared experience of being.
What is shared, most fundamentally, is mortality, and a vulnerability to pain, hunger, and “the thousand natural shocks that flesh is heir to,” as Hamlet put it. “Shall we not have sympathy with the muskrat which gnaws its third leg off, not as pitying its sufferings, but, through our kindred mortality, appreciating its majestic pains and its heroic virtue? Are we not made its brothers by fate?,” Thoreau muses in an 1854 journal entry celebrating a muskrat’s attempt to free himself from a trap.[iv] It is this recognition of the shared bodily experience of human and nonhuman creatures that leads Thoreau to characterize animal killing as “murder” in the passage with which I began.[v] Donna Haraway, following Derrida, claims that the question of murder is at the heart of human exceptionalism, the claim of absolute difference between human and nonhuman animals. In When Species Meet, she writes, “only human beings can be murdered…Every living being except Man can be killed but not murdered.  To make Man merely killable is the height of moral outrage; indeed, it is the definition of genocide” (78). For this reason, using the word “murder” to describe the deliberate killing of animals is not simple hyperbole, it’s a fundamental challenge to the anthropocentric logic by which only human lives merit moral consideration. After Thoreau describes the brutal ant battle he witnesses in “Brute Neighbors,” he disrupts the easy distinction between the value and meaning of human and nonhuman death when he reflects, “I was myself excited somewhat even as if they had been men. The more you think of it, the less the difference” (220-221).





[i] Richard J. Schneider writes “most readers find ‘Higher Laws’ …to be exasperating in its puritanic insistence on the virtues of a vegetarian diet” (100). Nancy Mayer’s consideration of the ethics on display in “Higher Laws” is also representative of this position when Mayer claims that “Thoreau doesn’t, after all, really have much to say about actual animals, and, towards the end of the chapter, the whole argument dissolves discouragingly into a prudish diatribe against coffee, tea, and gluttony that begins to sound suspiciously like an unwitting revelation of the author’s private foibles” (27). In this essay I hope to demonstrate that Thoreau does, in fact, have important things to say about “actual animals,” and as I have argued elsewhere, Thoreau’s “prudish diatribe” against the substances named by Mayer is in fact a complex intervention into antebellum debates about capitalism, citizenship, freedom and the body. For this argument, see Neely, “Embodied Politics: Antebellum Vegetarianism and the Dietary Economy of Walden.”
[ii] Walden, 206.
[iii] Philosophy and Animal Life, 45-6. See also page 92.
[iv] Journals, February 5, 1854.
[v] In his annotated edition of Walden, Jeffrey Cramer points out that Thoreau made other references to taking an animal’s life as “murder.” In The Maine Woods Thoreau uses the word to describe the moose killing, and in an 1847 letter he uses the word to describe killing animals for scientific specimens. See Walden: A Fully Annotated Edition, 204.


Works Cited
Cavell, Stanley, Cora Diamond, John McDowell, Ian Hacking, and Cary Wolfe. Philosophy and Animal Life. New York: Columbia UP, 2008. Print.

Mayer, Nancy. “Hunting the Human Animal: The Art of Ethical Perception in "Higher Laws." The Concord Saunterer 17 (2009): 27-43. Print.

Neely, Michelle C. “Embodied Politics: Antebellum Vegetarianism and the Dietary Economy of WaldenAmerican Literature 85.1 (2013): 33-60. Print.

Schneider, Richard J. “Walden.” The Cambridge Companion to Henry David Thoreau. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995. Print.

Thoreau, Henry David. The Writings of Henry David Thoreau, Journal Vol. 7: 1853-1854. Eds. Nancy Craig Simmons and Ron Thomas. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2009. Print.
--. Walden: A Fully Annotated Edition Ed. Jeffrey S. Cramer. New Haven: Yale UP, 2004. Print.

Friday, June 20, 2014

"The only real elysium”: Thoreau’s Meeting of Spirit and Matter


I wish to suggest two things: first, that Thoreau’s writings reveal his understanding of spirit as inherent in matter—that is, Thoreau knew the physical world as simultaneously and essentially material and spiritual; and, second, that Thoreau’s experience of spirit offers promising avenues for historicizing New Materialist attempts to theorize the relation between humanity and the rest of the material world.
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On October 18, 1856, Thoreau wrote in his Journal about an afternoon spent “a-chestnutting.”  He describes various aspects of his experience--a tree where he gathered the nuts, the anatomy of chestnut burrs, and the shapes of the fruits within each burr.  The journal entry focuses primarily on the physical characteristics of this particular form of matter: the chestnut.  Thoreau then shifts his focus briefly, addressing his neighbors’ views of his typical afternoon practice—namely, walking and closely observing aspects of the material world.  He writes that in spite of his neighbors’ concern over how he spends his days engaged with natural phenomena, he finds his practice profoundly edifying—even spiritual.  He calls it, in fact, “the only real elysium.”  Here is the statement within its fuller context, where Thoreau describes the great satisfaction he experiences through his daily practice: “I see that my neighbors look with compassion on me--that they think it is a mean & unfortunate destiny which makes me to walk in these fields & woods so much & sail on this river alone-- But so long as I find here the only real elysium I cannot hesitate in my choice” (Journal, Ms. Vol. 21: 67).1 
For our purposes here today, it’s notable that Thoreau’s phrase, “real elysium,” is actually an oxymoron, as “elysium” invokes the fanciful, figurative Elysian fields of mythology and therefore can hardly be deemed “real.”  A real, earthly Elysium is comparable to a real fairy, or a real Narnia--but Thoreau knew this, of course, and for him this was likely just the point of his rhetorical construction.  As he would write in his journal for August 3, 1852 of his feelings of what he called feeling “affected” and experiencing “enchantment” when immersed in the natural world, “this enchantment is no delusion”; rather, he writes, it is “fact”—as much a part of “reality” as the ground on which he stands (Journal 5: 271-72).  Similarly, here in October of 1856, Thoreau’s encounters with the natural world produced not merely a glimpse into that ideal, blessed afterlife of the gods and the chosen heroic, but a real state of heightened spirituality.2
Indeed, Thoreau implies, the only route to the ultimate spiritual state available to humankind comes through close attention to the material realm.  What his neighbors can look upon only with compassion—with pity, that is, for his suffering and unfortunate circumstances—Thoreau looks upon as akin to what environmental philosopher Bruce Foltz calls, drawing on the Greek, a noetics of nature.  Foltz defines “noetics” as “the highest kind of knowledge, and therefore the highest moment of earthly life”—namely, “the unencumbered exercise of that highest faculty of alertness and heedfulness and comprehension,” one “‘open to the presence of the invisible within the visible” (7).  Thoreau’s engagements with matter enable his practice of noetics or, in his phrasing, his pursuit of the “only real elysium”—his experience, that is, of the meeting of spirit and matter.
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Bruce Foltz has asked the intriguing question, “Could it be that an environmental aesthetic must ultimately entail something like an environmental theology?” (xii).  In the last few decades, several additional thinkers have similarly suggested that the present environmental crisis is a crisis of culture and, ultimately, of spirit.  In this light, perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the theoretical pursuit known as the New Materialism is its theorists’ desire to articulate a conception of the nonhuman material world that is strikingly similar to the one Thoreau pursues—that is, a position that at once acknowledges both the complex natural history of physical life forms and their interactions, and the evasive, unquantifiable, and enigmatic qualities of all matter that seem unfathomable to humans but that nonetheless affect us.  Put differently: in its theory of matter, New Materialism insists upon both the scientifically demonstrable intricate physicality of matter and its indefinable, ineffable nature.  Given its impulse to give both scientific understanding and the elusive vitality of matter their due, I have come to see the New Materialism as an academic-theoretical attempt to ameliorate this crisis of spirit. 
On the one hand, New Materialists emphasize the material world in physical and bio-chemical terms—matter as the hard stuff of reality.  We see this, for example, in Jane Bennett’s work on “things”: she explores the materiality of food, metal, and stem cells (see Vibrant Matter).  We also find this emphasis on the physical essence of matter in Stacy Alaimo’s focus on the complex “trans-corporeality” of all life forms in the universe—that is, in the interconnectedness of all forms of materiality (“Trans-Corporeal Feminisms”).  In the graceful words of Ian Bogost, “[b]eing is various and unitary all at once” (19).  Or as Joni Mitchell sings, we are stardust—yet we are also plastics and pesticides.  The material world, then, is both physical and physically (and chemically) interconnected.
On the other hand, New Materialism also insists upon an aspect of materiality at once part and parcel of its physicality but also beyond it, and this aspect of matter evades easy capitulation to language.  Bennett uses the term “vital” to get at this  aspect of materiality (vii); she explains that she seeks to theorize a “vital materiality” as opposed to the modern “idea of matter as passive stuff, as raw, brute . . . inert” or “dull” (vii).  She wants “to theorize a vitality intrinsic to materiality” (xiii) and to recognize “the lively powers of material formations” (vii), which she dubs “thing-power” (xvi).  Other scholars have different names for this ineffable, vibrant quality of matter: Manuel De Landa refers to the “inherent creativity” of matter (de Landa 16), whereas Alaimo focuses on “matter as activity rather than passive substance” (Alaimo, “Trans-Corporeal” 245).  Physicist Karen Barad’s terms differ still; she describes the material world as “agential,” explaining that “[a]gency is not an attribute whatsoever—it is ‘doing’/‘being’ in its” interconnectivity with all other matter (“Posthumanist” 827).  While these theorists certainly differ in important respects that I do want to diminish here, they also share the conviction that matter contains, embodies, and exists as a heretofore largely overlooked life force.
The point that I wish to emphasize here in that these various theorists emphasize, in their distinct ways, the material world not merely as a conglomeration of interconnected and interrelated, ultimately physical, phenomena, but also, and different from this, the material realm as interconnected forces of vitality, power, and agency.  Bennett goes so far as to suggest that the vitality of matter has the ability to inform feeling or emotion when she uses the phase “impersonal affect” to describe vital materiality; that is, she understands matter to hold a “power” that is “impersonal,” in the sense that it is not responsive to or expressive of human personalities.  Bennett wants to “equate affect with materiality,” not to imagine affect as something additional to materiality (xii, xiii emphasis mine).  This sort of conception of matter’s vitality prevents the sort of naively romantic projection of human emotion onto material life forms that has plagued much nature writing; humans may bring their emotions to encounters with matter, but in this view, matter itself literally embodies affective power, and humans may choose to recognize this or not.  Arguably, however, recognizing this aspect of matter alters one’s relation to matter, leading humans to recognize this vitality as it “produce[s]” “enchantment” in us, or invites humans to be conscious of our own relation to the “‘colliding of particle-forces’” that comprise the universe and our own bodies (Bennett xiii).
Thoreau’s writings suggest a similar conception of the material world—one based in biology, chemistry, and the other sciences—but one also possessing a certain vital materiality, which he sometimes refers to as “spirit.”  Perhaps a reclaiming of the Thoreauvian notion of spirit might help provide historical contexts for—as well as deepen—the New Materialist efforts to articulate a vital power that pervades the material world.3
I invoke this word, “spirit,” in spite of its being a disparaged term in theoretical (and even many popular) circles.  In fact, I invoke the word “spirit” even though Bennett explicitly argues that her conception of the vitality of matter does not suppose “a spiritual supplement” to matter (xiii).  But Bennett’s phrasing here signals an adherence to a fairly modern (and widely embraced) conception of “spirit”--one that causes many of our own contemporaries to bristle but that Thoreau would not have held.  This modern view sees spirit precisely as a “supplement” injected into matter, or added into and thus emanating forth from matter, usually by means of a religious worldview either imposed by the human mind or “divinely infused” (Bennett xiii).  To this understanding, spirit is a faith-based supplement to matter.  For Thoreau, however, spirit is not a religious supplement, nor is it “the raw material for the creative activity of humans or God” (Bennett xiii).  Rather, spirit is both secular and of this world, present whether humans acknowledge it or not; and meaningful in and of itself—in fact, bearing a meaning that most often eludes humanity, rather than that answers its questions.  Spirit is intrinsic to matter, inherent in matter, an inextricable part of materiality itself4--much like the vitality, agency, and inherent creativity which theorists seek to claim today.
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Thoreau’s uses the term “spirit” in many ways in his writings—often casually, to refer to his own mood, to what we would call an alcoholic drink, or to the liquid solution in which he stores specimens. He also, however, uses the term to invoke his own interconnectedness with the rest of the material world, as well as a certain energy that pervades matter.  He writes, for instance, of his own “spirit” being affected by a cranberry bog, explaining that he “believe[s] almost in the personality of . . . planetary matter—feel[s] something akin to reverence for it” (Journal: Ms. Vol. 21: 304, 305).  On August 17, 1851, he similarly refers to his own spirit when he writes of attending to nature’s sounds—the wind, the cricket, the stream, and the goldfinch—precisely so he might recover the fullness of his being.  He describes himself as “recovering my spirits, my spirituality,” referring specifically to regaining a sense of his own relatedness to the world around him and of “the steady onward progress of the universe” (Journal 3: 368).  There are many moments like this when, even despite feeling pensive or melancholy, through his self-consciousness regarding his material connection to the world Thoreau says he is led to “endear the earth to me—make me value myself & rejoice.”  This, for Thoreau, is the zenith of spirituality (Journal 3: 369).  Recovering his spirituality, then, means, first, recalling his own corporeal participation in a materiality that transcends any specific moment or place—and then, second, valuing the vast material interconnections in which he is enmeshed.
Sometimes Thoreau experiences this sense of his own interconnectivity with the rest of matter and mentions the spirit of another life form (other than his own).  He speaks, for instance, of the “spirits” of the huckleberry (Journal, Ms. Vol. 33: 42) and of fungus as “so obviously . . . related to ourselves,” “the expression of an idea--growth according to a law--Matter not dormant--not raw--but inspired appropriated by spirit.”  Moreover, he notes, “the humblest fungus betrays a life akin to my own” (Journal, Ms. Vol. 27: 211).  He also recognizes spirit as it pertains to forces that are not specific life forms.  In Cape Cod, for instance, he acknowledges the “spiritual ocean” (127) and refers to a strong wind as “Spirit’s breath” (11).  In his Journal, he declares that the autumnal browning leaves of a shrub oak, in spite of having lost their summer green, “still have a kind of life in them” and are “spiritual” (Journal, Ms. Vol. 22: 147).  On May 12, 1857, he hears the song of a “bay-wing” and recognizes “the spirit of its earth song,” which recalls for Thoreau “the world that we jointly inhabit” (Journal, Ms. Vol. 23: 65).  These are clearly significant moments for Thoreau; indeed, it seems that only when he is reminded to think beyond his own corporeality and toward his interconnectedness with other forms of matter does he deem himself “a competent witness” to the world (Journal, Ms. Vol. 23: 67).
At times, Thoreau’s notion of spirit seems nearly religious--if we acknowledge what one scholar has called Thoreau’s :somewhat indefinite concept of deity” (Friesen 118; see also 117-122)—and if we allow the term “religious” to broadly encompass what John Steinbeck once referred to as “the understanding and the attempt to say that man is related to the whole thing, related inextricably to all reality, known and unknowable.”5  For example, in the “Chesuncook” section of The Maine Woods, he asserts that pine trees possess a “living spirit . . . as immortal as” his own (125).  Later in “The Allegash and East Branch” section, Thoreau laments, “The Anglo-American can indeed cut down, and grub up all this waving forest, and make a stump speech, and vote for Buchanan on its ruins, but he cannot converse with the spirit of the tree he fells” (314).  In fact, he argues, “there are spirits”--“not only [of the] stately pines, but fragile flowers, like the orchises” [sic: orchids] (212).
A tour through Thoreau’s writings suggests that, for him, spirit is the generativeness of the physical world—a vitality that pervades forms of matter.  Spirit also entails the essential connectivity and interactivity of all forms of matter (including human being and mind), as well as--crucially--a self-consciousness of one’s own place in the vitality of matter.  Only when he engages spirit does Thoreau consider himself to be living fully.
Thoreau once wrote in his journal about his spiritual fulfillment in recognizing the mysterious vitality of material “things”:
I seem to see somewhat more of my own kith and kin in the lichens on the rocks that in any books. . . .  I know of no redeeming qualities in me—but a sincere love for some things. . . .  When I condemned and condemn myself utterly—I think straightaway—but I rely on my love for some things. 
Therein I am whole and entire. Therein I am God-propt. (Journal I: 344-45)
At the start of this same journal entry, Thoreau had written, “our spirits never go beyond nature” (Journal 1:343), suggesting his beliefs both that the highest human experiences occur here on earth, and that earth serves as the only source of what some wish for in heaven.  That is, nature—the material realm—provides for Thoreau a deeply spiritual experience, “the only real elysium,” precisely through his own recognition and communion with what he understood as nature’s inherent spirituality.
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Thoreau’s writings demand that we acknowledge that there is nothing “new” about efforts to deepen our knowledge of our own human relatedness to the rest of the material world.6  Yet undoubtedly there is much to be gained through this effort to know what Bruce Foltz describes as “the visible elements that are manifest” as well as “the invisible elements that elude the perception of the senses” and “the darkness and mystery that still remain” (4).  As we seek this knowledge in this age of increasing environmental challenge, we will benefit from exploring further Thoreau’s engagements with the vitality of matter, the relation of these engagements to his sense of spirit as inherent in matter, and the undoubtedly related topic of what he elsewhere calls “higher law.”  We might thereby more fully realize Thoreau’s contributions to nineteenth-century efforts to arrive at the environmental aesthetic now sought through the New Materialism.
Notes
I am grateful to Samantha C. Harvey, James Finley, Kathleen Kelly for thoughtful readings of an earlier version of this essay.
1. References to Thoreau’s Journal are, whenever possible, from the Princeton Edition, cited by volume and page number.  Passages drawn from Thoreau’s journal manuscript volumes not yet published by Princeton are quoted from the on-line transcripts made available through the related University of Santa Barbara “The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau” site (http://thoreau.library.ucsb.edu/writings_journals.html); parenthetical citations point to manuscript volume and page numbers of this on-line transcript.
2. Thoreau’s sense of a “real elysium” is particularly interesting in light of the recent work of Dr. John Ratey, a clinical professor of psychiatry at Harvard University, who demonstrates in his 2014 book titled Go Wild that active walking in outdoor settings triggers chemical effects on our brains and bodies that make us not only healthier but also happier individuals.
3.  Thoreau’s understanding of spirit was deeply rooted in his historical moment, as well as steeped in the scientific efforts of his time to articulate a theory of all life forms—neither of which I have the space to discuss here, unfortunately.  The notion of a “dynamic and spiritual creative power in nature” dates back to early philosophy, as is conveyed by the philosophical concept Natura naturans, which has a long history in western thought--including in Coleridge and Emerson (Harvey 63; see also 177-78 n. 35).  Two recent studies suggest the category of “spirit” as central to understandings of Thoreau’s place in American Romanticism; both Samantha Harvey and David Greenham reclaim “spirit” as a crucial foundational concept in Transatlantic Romanticism.  In an important study of Emerson, Coleridge, and Transatlantic Transcendentalism, Harvey demonstrates that “Coleridge’s commitment to mediating the categories of nature, spirit, and humanity characterized an overarching Romantic concern that transcended national boundaries” (2). Greenham argues that spirit functions in the Romantic era not as a notion imposed upon the world or inserted into reality by the mind; nor, he suggests, is spirit necessarily related to a specific theological position.  Spirit is not “a self responding to some mere thing”; rather, spirit is both an “action which unifies subject and object and from which both emerge in their identity and difference,” and “a principle of unity” which “cannot be found in either the subject or in the object but rather in an identity which contains them both” (73).
4.  As Laura Dassow Walls demonstrates, for Alexander von Humboldt and for Thoreau after him, “matter does not embody spirit; it is in itself” (86).
5.  My thanks to Samantha C. Harvey for drawing my attention to this quotation.
6.  I am grateful to Kristen Case for encouraging me through an informal conversation to consider what makes the New Materialism “new.”
Works Cited
Alaimo, Stacy.  “Trans-Corporeal Feminisms and the Ethical Space of Nature.” Alaimo and
Hekman 237-64.
Alaimo, Stacy, and Susan Hekman, eds. Material Feminisms. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2008.
Barad, Karen. “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to
Matter.” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 28.3 (2003): 801-31.
Bennett, Jane.  Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Durham: Duke UP, 2010.
Bogost, Ian. Alien Phenomenology, Or What It’s Like to Be a Thing. Minneapolis: U of
Minnesota P, 2012.
De Landa, Manuel. A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History. New York: Swerve, 2000.
Foltz, Bruce V. The Noetics of Nature: Environmental Philosophy and the Holy Beauty of the
Visible.  New York: Fordham UP, 2014.
Friesen, Victor Carl.  The Spirit of the Huckleberry: Sensuousness in Henry Thoreau. 
Edmunton: U of Alberta P, 1984.
Ratey, John J. Go Wild: Free Your Body and Mind from the Afflictions of Civilization.  New
York: Little, Brown and Company, 2014.
Steinbeck, John.  The Log from the Sea of Cortez. (1941) Online:
Walls, Laura Dassow.  Seeing New Worlds: Henry David Thoreau and Nineteenth-Century
Natural Science. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1995.
Thoreau, Henry David. Cape Cod (1865). Ed. Joseph J. Moldenhauer. Princeton: Princeton UP,
1988.
Thoreau, Henry David. Journal, Vol. 1:1837-1844. Ed. Elizabeth Hall Witherell, William L.
Howarth, Robert Sattelmeyer, and Thomas Blanding. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1981.
Print.
---. Journal, Vol. 3: 1848-1851. Ed. Robert Sattelmeyer, Mark. R. Patterson, and William Rossi.
Princeton, Princeton UP, 1990. Print.
---. Journal, Vol. 5: 1852-1853. Ed. Patrick F. O’Connell. Princeton, Princeton UP, 1997. Print.
---.  Journal: Manuscript Volume 21. “April 23 - September 6, 1856: Transcript.” On-line:
---.  Journal: Manuscript Volume 22. “September 7, 1856 - April 1, 1857: Transcript.” On-line:
---.  Journal: Manuscript Volume 23. “April 2 - July 31, 1857: Transcript.” On-line:
---.  Journal: Manuscript Volume 27. “July 9 - November 9, 1858: Transcript.”
---.  Journal: Manuscript Volume 33. “November 23, 1860 - November 3, 1861: Transcript.”
---.  The Maine Woods. Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company (Riverside Edition), 1893. On-
line: https://archive.org/details/mainewoods00thoriala. Accessed June 12, 2014.

Friday, June 13, 2014

The Art of Losing: Reading Thoreau’s Journal Practices

Kristen Case

From Ball's? Hill the Great Meadow looks more light-perhaps it is the medium between the dark & light above mentioned. Mem. Try this experiment again. i.e. look not toward nor from the sun but athwart this line. Seen from this hill in this direction--there are here and there dark-shadows spreading rapidly over the surface here & there where the wind strikes the water. The water toward the sun seen from this height--shows not the broad silvery light but a myriad fine sparkles. The sky is full of light this morning--with different shades of blue--lighter below, darker above, separated perhaps by a thin strip of white vapor.-- Thicker in the east. (4:430-1)
This passage was likely written in pen in Thoreau’s attic room in the Main Street house on the morning of the 11th from field notes taken the morning of the 10th of April, 1852. At a later date, small additions and a footnote were added in pencil. In Thoreau’s journal practices, every journal entry bears reference to at least three temporal points: the moment of observation, the moment of writing, and the moment of subsequent correction, gathering, and rearranging. But each of these modes must be further complicated: observation was not a single moment but a span of several hours of walking punctuated by the writing of field notes. Writing was in part a process of reading and arranging those notes, typically the following morning, and recasting them in the present tense. The retrospective journal-work—the penciled corrections and deletions, the copying of dates and notes into the charts of seasonal phenomena—was similarly ongoing and intermittent (Neufelt and Simmons 631). Each of these practices not only overlapped with but also helped to constitute and sustain the others.

Reading with Thoreau’s material writing process in mind, I am struck by the continual crossing of temporal experiences manifested in the use of the present tense for the previous day’s observations: “The sky is full of light this morning.” The present tense is and the deictic this are adopted here not as they might be in a finished literary work to affect a reader with a sense of immediacy but rather as a making-present, for the writer, of a lived past: a gathering of past experience into the present materiality of writing. Similarly, the instruction “try this experiment again” projects a past and present self into the future by means of an imagined repetition, an experiment, that most Thoreauvian of modes, in which thought is a practice, “an ‘It works!’ that belongs to the register of creation” (Stengers 42).

The notation – “Mem. try this experiment again” – is a material memorandum: gerundive of memorare, literally “something to be brought to mind” the “to be” here signaling that the mind in question is located in the future: writing --the physical process and the material page--bridges the moment of seeing and the moment of seeing again, becomes a space in which each of these temporal points may be experienced simultaneously.

One might read this entry as reflective of what Jane Bennett has called a “vital materialism”: this is no passive, objective landscape, but a living one, “dark-shadows spreading rapidly over the surface.” Moreover the entry presents not a series of natural “objects” but rather a field of shifting phenomena in which the observer is not only an active but also a constitutive part. Here we might say that Thoreau’s vision corresponds to a new materialist ontology, in which, as Karen Barad writes, the “primary ontological units are not ‘things’ but phenomena—dynamic topological reconfigurings/ entanglements/ relationalities/ (re)articulations” (818). I am drawn to this reading, but I have my reservations about it, too. The claim that Thoreau anticipates new materialism invites me to attend to certain moments of the journal: particularly moments of encounter and of phenomenological description. But I wonder what might be elided in this critical practice, what my investment in this redescription of Thoreau’s writing might obscure. In recognition of the dangers of this investment, I want to take as a critical starting point not the new materialism, which refers to a philosophical position, but the closely related field of science studies, which refers to a practice: specifically, the study of scientific knowledge as it is materially produced.[i] Following philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers, I want to read the Journal as an “ecology of practices” (37).

*

The passage that follows is from the Journal entry of the following day, April 11, 1852, likely written up the morning of the 12th from field notes.

The sight of Nut Meadow Brook in Brown’s land--reminds me that the attractiveness of a brook depends much on the character of its bottom…I stop to look at the circular shadows of the dimples over the yellow sand-- & the dark brown clams on their edges in the sand at the bottom. I hear the sound of the piano below as I write this and feel as if the winter in me were at length beginning to thaw--for my spring has been even more backward than nature’s. For a month past life has been a thing incredible to me. None but the kind gods can make me sane-- If only they will let their south winds blow on me. I ask to be melted. You can only ask of the metals that they be tender to the fire that melts them. To naught else can they be tender. The sweet flags are now starting up under water two inches high-- & minnows dart. A pure brook is a very beautiful object to study minutely--it will bear the closest inspection--even to the fine air bubbles like minute globules of quicksilver that lie on its bottom. (4:433-4)

I have come to this passage wanting to talk about materiality, but the passage wants to talk to me about time. That is: the word materialist seeks to make a claim. The phrase new materialist complicates that claim by adding new claims to it. (Roughly, we might say that materialism makes the claim that the world is composed only of matter, and that new materialism adds to that claim several complicating claims about the nature of matter: principally that is more agential, complex, self-organizing, and transverse than allowed for in earlier materialist philosophies.) But when, oriented by these claims, I return to Thoreau’s material processes, I find that these processes are neither governed nor governable by claims but by rather by other, related processes which push me away from the language of philosophical position or argument and toward the particulars of a life, which is to say, toward the astonishingly replete material record of an ecology of practices. The critical move to isolate these practices from one another and read them principally as evidence for a position seems to me a fundamental distortion. To say this is perhaps to experiment with a different sort of claim: to re-make the bounds,[ii] in this sense, is not to forgo the tools of literary or philosophical analysis in favor of a more biographical or historicist approach, but rather to submit my thinking about Thoreau to the demands of what Stengers calls, borrowing from biological studies of symbiosis, “reciprocal capture.” “In contrast [to parasitism], we can speak of reciprocal capture whenever a dual process of identity construction is produced: regardless of the manner, and usually in ways that are completely different, identities that coinvent one another integrate a reference to the other for their own benefit.” (Stengers 36)

I want to read the passage above in terms of its complex and fluid materiality. I want to talk about the circular shadows of the dimples over the yellow sand and darting minnows and minute globules of quicksilver, but the passage presses upon me its distortions and layerings of time, its relentless maneuverings between various nows, its conspicuous navigation of a field of losses. These temporal shifts operate as a constraint.[iii] My pull toward Barad’s “dynamic topological reconfigurings/ entanglements/ relationalities/ (re)articulations” is not refused but complicated, resisted, by something I had not wanted to see: not relation but isolation, withdrawal, loss.

Most arresting here is Thoreau’s interruption of his present-tense recording of the previous afternoon’s experiences with a real-time rendering of his thoughts while writing, each of these two senses of the present already estranged in the way words always are from the experiences which they extend. And so a double immediacy, a double present, and also a double loss. “For a month past life has been a thing incredible to me” is suggestive of Thoreau’s particular and periodic bouts of practical skepticism: an inability to credit life, to grant it the value of his active investment. As H. Daniel Peck observes in his invaluable study Thoreau’s Morning Work, the expression of this crisis as an estrangement from nature, and especially from seasonal rhythms --“my spring has been even more backward than nature’s”–reflects Thoreau’s life long preoccupation with time as both linear (and so composed of continual loss) and circular (and so restorative).

What might be lost, then, in attending to Thoreau’s positions at the expense of his processes, is loss itself: the mourning occasionally spoken but always inscribed in his evocations of even the liveliest of material entanglements. I want to suggest that the ecology of practices that constituted the Journal work was at least in part a management of that loss—a way of practicing daily both passionate attachment and a willed passivity in letting go. If a reabsorbtion in life is what Thoreau awaits and begins to feel–or rather, what he awaited and began to feel in his study on the morning of April 12th as he wrote the afternoon of April 11th –it is a reabsorbtion itself composed of passivity and loss, a wholly dependent asking and the registering of an already-vanished present. To attend to this loss is not, I would submit, to position it against Thoreau’s evocations of the materiality of nature, but rather to see these as part of Thoreau’s complex mechanism–itself composed of material practices–for registering time and integrating loss.

In closing, a hypothesis: that as readers we might follow Thoreau in a different way than we have supposed–not as a representative of certain literary or philosophical positions, but as an expert practitioner of an ethic that encompasses, along with active engagement, a letting go that might transform critical parasitism into reciprocal capture. To adopt such an ethic requires the kind of attention a materialist orientation can foster, but it also requires a tenderness to the fire: a willingness to be transformed by those aspects of a text most difficult to account for in our critical discourse.


Notes:

[i] Many new materialists, including Karan Barad and Stacy Alaimo, work within the field of science studies. Likewise, the most influential figures within science studies, Bruno Latour and Donna Haraway, have been important sources for new materialism; however new materialism represents a more recent and more internally consistent phenomenon than science studies. Another, perhaps more contested, way to describe this relation would be to say that new materialism represents a recent outgrowth within science studies that critiques the “strong constructivist” position of earlier work in the field, seeking to balance a perceived overemphasis on cultural and linguistic forces with a renewed attention to materiality. For the purposes of this paper I am interested mainly in the distinction between the practice and position.

[ii] “That is what I had been doing all my life, making bounds, or rather finding them, remaking what had been unmade, where they were away” (Journal 10: 232).

[iii] “Unlike conditions, which are always relative to a given existent that needs to be explained, established, or legitimized, a constraint provides no explanation, no foundation, no legitimacy. A constraint must be satisfied, but the way it is satisfied remains, by definition, an open question” (Stengers 43).

Works Cited: 

Barad, Karen. “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter

Comes to Matter.” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 28:3 (2003). Web. 10 December, 2013.

Neufelt, Leonard N. and Nancy Craig Simmons. “Historical Introduction.” The Writings of Henry D.  Thoreau: Journal, Volume 4: 1851-52. Ed. Leonard N. Neufeldt and Nancy Craig Simmons. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1992. Print.

Peck, H. Daniel. Thoreau’s Morning Work: Memory and Perception in A Week on The Concord and

Merrimack Rivers, the Journal, and Walden. New Haven: Yale UP, 1990. Print.

Stengers, Isabelle. Cosmopolitics I. Trans. Robert Bononno. Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota P, 2010. Print.

Thoreau, Henry David. The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Journal, Volume 4: 1851-52. Ed. Leonard N. Neufeldt and Nancy Craig Simmons. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1992. Print.